patch 9.0.2108: [security]: overflow with count for :s command Commit: https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/ac63787734fda2e294e477af52b3bd601517fa78 Author: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org> Date: Tue Nov 14 20:45:48 2023 +0100 patch 9.0.2108: [security]: overflow with count for :s command Problem: [security]: overflow with count for :s command Solution: Abort the :s command if the count is too large If the count after the :s command is larger than what fits into a (signed) long variable, abort with e_value_too_large. Adds a test with INT_MAX as count and verify it correctly fails. It seems the return value on Windows using mingw compiler wraps around, so the initial test using :s/./b/9999999999999999999999999990 doesn't fail there, since the count is wrapping around several times and finally is no longer larger than 2147483647. So let's just use 2147483647 in the test, which hopefully will always cause a failure Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>

/* XPM */
static char * tb_split_xpm[] = {
/* width height ncolors cpp [x_hot y_hot] */
"18 18 5 1 0 0",
/* colors */
" 	s none	m none	c none",
".	s topShadowColor	m none	c #DCDEE5",
"X	s iconColor1	m black	c #000000",
"o	s iconColor2	m none	c #FFFFFF",
"O	s bottomShadowColor	m black	c #5D6069",
/* pixels */
"                  ",
"  .XXXXXXXXXXX    ",
"  .X........oX    ",
"  .X..o.....oXO   ",
"  .X.oo.....oXO   ",
"  .X........oXO   ",
"  .X........oXO   ",
"  .XoooooooooXO   ",
"  .XXXXXXXXXXXO   ",
"  .XOOOOOOOOoXO   ",
"  .X..o.....oXO   ",
"  .X.oo.....oXO   ",
"  .X........oXO   ",
"  .X........oXO   ",
"  .XoooooooooXO   ",
"  .XXXXXXXXXXXO   ",
"     OOOOOOOOOO   ",
"                  "};